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instant he received them, and in all events, except they happened
to be damaged by the act of God or of the King's enemies.
This is the case stated by Lord Tenterden in the part of his book
above referred to, as one, indeed the principal authority upon the
subject; and we entirely concur in it, and it seems to us conclusive
in the present case. In our opinion, the application of the princi-
ple laid down in this case affords the only true rule for ascertaining
with accuracy and certainty the liability of the master and owner
of a general ship: viz., that prima facie he is a common carrier,
but that his responsibility may be either enlarged or qualified by
the terms of the bill of lading, if there be one, and that the ques-
tion whether the defendant is liable or not, is to be ascertained by
the terms of this document when it exists. There will therefore be
no rule.
After this judgment had been pronounced.
POLLOCK, C. B., said-If, indeed, the rats had made a hole in
the ship through which water came in and damaged the cargo, that
might very likely be a case of sea damage. And
ALDURsoN, B,, added-Our judgment does not touch that ques-
tion. A rat making a hole in the ship may be the same thing as
if a sailor made one.
Rule refused.
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New York Court of Appeals, October, 1852.
Agent-Liabilit y of Princ pal.-Where the plaintiff and defendants
were owners of separate parcels of grain which were stored with the same
warehouseman, such warehouseman, in delivering the grain, acted as the
agent of the owner who directed the delivery,-and such owner was res-
ponsibl6 for his acts in regard to such delivery. Cobb v. Doics. Opinion
by GARDINER, J.
So that when the defendants gave an order on the warehouseman to
deliver their grain, and by mistake or otherwise he delivered the plain-
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tiff's, and not the defendants', whereby the defendants received the bene-
fit of such delivery, as if it had been their own, it was held that the plain-
tiff can recover the value of the defendants, they being responsible for the
wrongful act of the warehouseman, who, in the delivery, acted as their
agent. Ibid.
Bailment-Advance of .Money on Warehouseman's Receipt.-A ware-
houseman's receipt does not cover any goods, except such as are actually
in his possession at the time of giving it, and though assigned to a third
person who has in good faith advanced money upon it, does not give him
any claim to, or title in property afterwards delivered to the warehouse-
man. Gardiner v. ,Snydam. Opinion by RuGoGLs, C. J.
In this case, the defendants advanced money on a warehouseman's
receipt, for 536 barrels flour, when it appeared that he had only 211 bar-
rels in his possession at the time. Held, the defendants could claim only
for the 211 barrels, as against third persons, although the warehouseman
afterwards received enough more to fill the receipt. Ibid.
Banking Corporations, Powers of.-Every association organized under
the Act to authorize the business of banking, and the Acts amending
the same, is a moneyed corporation within the meaning of the statutes of
this State, relating to moneyed corporations; and is bound and affected
by those statutes, excepting only so far as such statutes are inconsistent
with the provisions either of the Act to authorize the business of banking,
or of the act amending the same. Pell v. The State of Ohio. North
American Trust and Banking Company v. The Same. Opinions by
GARDINEr. and EDMONDS, J.J.
Such associations are banking corporations, and possess only authority
to carry on the business of banking in the manner, and with the powers
specified in said act. Ibid.
They have no power to purchase state or other stocks for the purpose
of selling them for profit, or as a means of raising money, except when
such stocks have been received in good faith, as securityjor a loan made
by, or a debt due to, such association, or when taken in payment, in whole
or in part, of such loan or debt. Ibid.
Corporation-Illegal Banking--'ertificate of Deposit.-The plaintiffs
made a loan whereby they received from the borrower certain bonds and
mortgages in security for the loan at an interest of 7 per cent., and issued
their certificates of deposit bearing 41 per cent. interest, which they gave
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to the borrower as the produce of the loan. Hdd, that the transaction
was illegal, as the company, under its charter, bad no right to issue such
paper, to loan or put in circulation as money. New York Life Ins. and
Trust Co. v. Chester Bedee and others. Opinion by WmLLEs, J.
Quoere? Whether the transaction was not also usurious? Ibid.
Criminal Law-Larceny--Robbery on the HTigh Seas-Jurisdic-
tion.-The offence charged against the prisoner was thdt of having stolen
money from a steamboat navigating Long Island Sound, on her passage
from New York to Norwich, Connccticut, and when somewhere opposite
the county of Suffolk, in this State, and he was therefore indicted for
grand larceny committed in the county of New York. Held, that the
indictment could not be sustained because it did not show whether the
prisoner was accused of larceny in New York, or a larceny (om nitted in
another county and bringing the stolen property to New York. Ana the
conviction could not be sustained, because Long Island Sound, where this
offence was committed, is not a river, lake or canal, within the meaning of
our statute,.but an arm of the sea. .Manly v. The People.
Judgment reversed, and prisoner ordered to be discharged from custody.
Opinions by WELLEs and EDMONDS, J.J.
Criminal Law-M .rder-Error.-It appearing from the affidavits,
that the judgment in this'case was actually rendered after the enactment of
the statute allowing a writ of error, although from the record the contrary
might be inferred, the motion to dismiss the writ of error denied. The
People v. Clark. JouzzsoNz, J., and RUGGLES, OH. J.
The term "premeditated design," used in our statute, defining murder,
has the same signification with the phrases of the common law, "malice
aforethought," and "malice prepense," except that it intends express de-
sign or malice, and not implied. To constitute murder under our statute,
there must be an express design to kill, and if there is such a design, it is
enough that it be formed on the instant, and be a part of the fatal blow.
id.
In cases of deliberate homicide, where there is a specific intention to
take life, the offence is murder. The charge of the Oyer and Terminer
was therefore right, when it instructed the jury, that if the killing was
produced by the prisoner, with an intention to kill, though that intention
was formed at the instant of striking the fatal blow, it was murder. Ibid.
Criminal Law-Murder.-On a trial for murder, where the Court of
Oyer and Terminer charged the jury that-"if they believed that the kill-
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ing was produced by the prisoner with an intention to kill, though that in-
tention was formed at the instant of striking the fatal blow, it was murder."
It was held that the charge was correct, and that no previous meditation was
necessary to constitute the crime; the blow being struck with an intention
to take life, it is the "premeditated desigu" specified in the statute. lThe
People v. Sullivan. RUtGLES, C. J., and JonzsoN, J.
Debtor and- Creditor- Voluntary Assignment- Wien Yaid.--k vol-
untary assignment made by a debtor under failing circumstances, is void
if it contain a clause authorising the assignee to sell the assigned property
on credit, because it is calculated to binder and delay creditors, and re-
serves to the debtor or the assignee of his own choice, the absolute control
over the debtor's property, which in justice, belongs to the creditor, and
enables them, instead of the creditor, to determine when the debt shall be
paid. Nicholson v. Leavitt. EDMONDs and GARDINER, J. J.
Eminent Domain-Property taken for public use.-The state in exer-
cising its right of eminent domain, may direct not only as to the quantity
of land or property which may be taken for the public use, but also as to
the quantity or extent of interest in such property, which may be requir-
ed or taken for such public use; thus, it may take an estate for life or
years, as well as an estate in fel, and where it has been taken in fee or ab-
solute ownership, and paid for as such, it will n6 t revert to the original
owner upon the ceasing of -the public use. .leyward v. City of INezv
York. WELLEs, J.
Where private property was taken for a public use, as for an alms-house,
and the whole value of the owner's interest was assessed and paid for, and
he accepted such sum thus awarded, the abandonment of the use of the
premises for such public purpose, does not cause the property to revert to
the original owner. Ibid.
Error-Exceptions-Bills and Notes-Due Diligence-Protest.-The
exception being to the whole charge, and some part of the charge
being correct, the exception is unavailing. Bunt v. Ataybee. WAIsoN
and EDMONDS, J. J.
Where a party has attempted to protest a promissory note by a notary,
and has given evidence thereof, he is not precluded from proving that he
has actually protested the note by one not a notary. Ibid.
When there is no dispute about the facts, the question whether due di-
ligence has been used in seeking the residence of the endorser, is a ques-
tion for the court and not the jury. ibid.
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Sed quwre? Whether it is due diligence to inqire merely of the hold-
ers of the note, and such as they may refer them to, and whether inquiry
ought not to have been made of the makers, as to the residence of the in-
dorser-the maker living in the same town with the notary? ibid.
Indian Titles-Duties of Commissioners under Treaty.-In a convey-
ance of lands by the Indians, and in a treaty confirming and authorizing
such conveyance, it was stipulated that the grantees should not have
possession until the value of the improvements made by individual Indians
should be appraised by commissioners, as provided in the conveyance and
treaty, and such value paid into the War office, for the benefit of the
Indian owning the improvement. The commissioners were prevented from
going on the premises, by individual Indians, and reported the aggregate
value of the improvements only, and not each one's share, as required by
the grant and treaty, certifying thit they had been prevented by the force
used, &c. Held, that that was not a valid excuse, and that the right of
the grantees to the possession, depended upon the individual appraisement
as a condition precedent, which not being performed, the grantees were
not entitled to. the possession. .Blacksmith v. Kendle. Opinions by
E'DUMONDS and WEIrs, J. J.
Landlord and Tenant-Lease in .Fec--Reservation of.Price on Aliena-
tion.-In a durable lease, or lease in fce, a clause reserving to the lessor,
a portion of the price or consideration money upon a sale of the premises
by the lessee or his assigns, is void, because repugnant to the grant of
the absolute estate. Depeyster v. Michael. Opinion by RuGOLES, Chief
Judge; GRIDLEY and JOHNSON, J. J.
Landlord and Tenani-Covenant.-Where, in a lease of a pier and
bulkhead in. the city of New York, the lessee covenanted to make, at his
own expense, all the repairs which might be necessary, upon the bulk-
head and pier, and upon all extensions which might be made during the
term, and to pay all taxes and assessments upon the demised premises
during the term, and during the term there was an extension of the pier,
under an ordinance of the Common Council, the expense of which 'was
paid by the lessor.
Held, that the extension thus erected was a part of the demised pre-
mises, and belonged to the lessee during the term. .fancox v. .Tacgues.
Opinions by EDMONDS and WATSON, J. J.
Rivers-Right of Riparian Owners to compensatim for Soil taken for
a Railroad.-The Owners of land on the bank of a navigable river, where
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the tide ebbs and flows, and whose title extends no further than to high
water mark, have no such property in the land under water, or the privi-
lege of using the river a,, to be entitled to recover damages against a,
railroad company, who, by grant from the State, construct their road
below high water mark, and cut the riparian owner off from access to the
channel of the river. Gould v. Iludson Rircr Railroad Comaay.
Opinions by EDMIONDS and VATSON, J. J.
Shpping-Charer Party- arranty-Danzagcs.-W here, in a charter
party the vessel was described as "1 the schooner J. If., of the burden of
190 tons, or thereabouts, now lying in the harbor of New York," such
words were words of description only, and were not a warranty that she
was of such a tonnage, or that she was then lying in the harbor of New
York. Those are matters open to the inspection of the parties, and will
not be regarded as a warranty, unless it is very clear that such was the
intention of the parties. Ashburner v. Bale7in. Opinions by RUGGLES
Ch. J., and JEWETT, J.
The rule of damages in such case against the charterer who refuses to
perform, is the amount specified in the charter party, deducting only such
sum as the vessel earned during the time she would have taken to have
performed the voyage, and excluding what she might have earned in her
return voyage. .Ibid.
TrUst- Com2 ensation of .Attorne.-Where a trustee, who held certain
lands in trust to receive and pay over the rents and profits, had, together
with the cestui gue trust, employed an attorney to defend the trust estate
from attacks made upon it, and which threatened its existence, the attorney
can recover compensation for his services in an action against both trustee
and cestui que trust, seeking to enforce the claim as a lien on the trust
estate ; it appearing to the court that that was a proper exercise of the
discretionary power of the trustee. Aroyes v. Blakeman. Opinions by
WATsoN and WELLE s, J. J.
But where the attorney was employed only by the cestui lue trust, with-
out the consent or approbation of the trustee, he cannot recover against
the trust estate. Ibid.
Vender and endee-Aucton.-An auctioneer has such a special
property or interest in the subject matter of the sale, that he may sue for
the price in his own name, unless the principal or real owner elect to sue,
and it is not necessary to prove any special interest or property; it flows
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from his position as auctioneer, and proof that he has no interest, will not
defeat the action. .A1ta v. Minturn. Opinions by Evoxro3 DS and Joux-
soN, J. J.
A private sale of the property offered for sale at public auction, made
in violation of the statute, does not vitiate the public sale. The object of
the statute is to protect the public sale, and its Lt'cct is merely to render
the private sale void. idh.
But if it were otherwise, the purchaser at the public sale cannot takl
advantage of the defect by retaining the property and refusing to pay for
it. That would be affirming the contract in part, and rescinding it in
part. He must rescind it in 1tot, and in order to do that, he nutL place
all the parties in the precise position they were in before the contract was
made. If he cannot do that, he cannot rescind. biL.
Vendor and Vendee-.Aistake as to quantity of land sold.-In a sale (f
land, where both in the agreement for the sale and in the deed carrying
out the agreement, the premises are described as containing so many
acres, "more or less," those words being inserted upon deliberation, be-
cause neither party professed to know the precise quantity contained in the
boundaries of the deed, the courts will not interfere to correct any mistake
as to quantity. And where the contract has been consummated without
fraud, misrepresentation or concealment, as to the real quantity, the
courts will not inquire whether there has been a mutual mi-take as to the
supposed quantity contained within certain specified boundaries. Fame v.
Martin. Opinions by GARDINER and ED30O2NDS, J. J.
A mistake of. fact between parties, will not be corrected unless it is as
palpable as if admitted, and has been so great as to produce the conviction
that but for the mistake, the contract would never have been made, and,
being made, was entirely different from what was intended. id.
Supreme Court of the United States, -December, 1852.
Fquity-hnjunction-Action at Law.-T-pon an appeal from a decree
of the Circuit Court of the United States, for the Southern District of
Mississippi, by which an injunction previously awarded the appellants, was
dissolved,.and the bill dismissed with costs.
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The decision of the Supreme Court upon this appeal propounds no new
principle; but explicitly re-affirms the well settled doctrines of equity
jurisprudence, as declared by the Court in the cases of Creath's Adminis-
trator v. Shm, and of Truly v. Wanzer in -the 5th vol. of Howard's
Reports, the former at page 192, and the latter at page 141, of that vol-
ume, cases in their principal features almost identical with this. The bill
in this case sought relief from the obligation of a contract for the purchase
of slaves, alleged to have been imported into the State of Mississippi, and
sold in violation of the constitution and laws of that State. A judgment
at law had been obtained against the complainant, Sample, by default, as
was alleged by him in consequence of his having been lulled to security
by representations from the respondent. After this judgment, and after
execution sued and levied thereon, the complainant, Sample, with the
other parties to the bill as his sureties, executed a forthcoming bond for
the delivery to the officer of the property levied upon, which bond, on
being forfeited, had the force of a judgment by the law of the State. The
complainant, Sample, did not aver ignorance, on his part, of the alleged
illegality 6f the compact impugned, nor did he disclaim all purpose by
him to evade the constitution and laws of Mississippi: The charge of
practices by the respondent, by which the complainant was prevented, or
would have been excused from making his defence at law, was not sus-
tained by the evidence adduced.
The Supreme Court were of the opinion,-1, That, conceding the con-
tract to have been such as it had been represented by the complainant,
Sample, still it shewed him to have been ia 2 ari delicto with those of
whom he complained. 2. That however the nature of the consideration,
(if really such as he alleged it to be,) might have shielded him against the
attempts of confederates, so far as these should have been urged through
the instrumentality of courts of justice, it would have invested him with
no rights, no claim to exemption from advantages accidentally obtained
by the former, and especially could give him no standing before a tribunal
which extends its aid and counienance to those only who can present
themselves with pure hands, and as being above suspicion. 3. That the
defence, for the first time attempted by the complainant in his bill, was a
legal defence, and should have been made in the action at law: that after
the judgment against the complainant by default, he, by voluntarily exe-
cuting the forthcoming bond, which he knew had the force of a judgment,
had waived all claim to that defence, and in effect given a judgment by
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confession. That after these proceedings, to permit the complainant to
begin a contest which he had repeatedly declined, would be to permit him
to falsify his formal and deliberate acts-would be subversive of the set-
tled practice of the courts, and would lead to endless litigation. ,amnple,
Ap1pellant, v. Barnes, .lpellee. Opinion per TA.NY, C. J.
State eg4islation--Constitut.onal Law.-A1 state, under its general and
admitted power to define and punish offences against its own peace and
policy, may repel from its borders an unacceptable population, whether
paupers, criminals, fugitives or liberated slaves; and, consequen'tly, may
punish her citizens and others, who thwart this policy, by harboring, scere-
ting, or in any way assisting such fugitives.
It is no objection to such legislation, that the offender may be liable to
punishment under the act of Congress for the same acts, when injurious to
the owner of the fugitive slave.
The case of .Prigy v. Thc Comnmonwealth of Pnn'ca, 16 Peters, pre-
sented the following questions, which were decided by the Court.
1st. That under and in virtue of the Constitution of the United States,
the owner of a slave is clothed with entire authority, in every state in the
-Union, to seize and recapture his slave wherever he can do it without ille-
gal violence or a breach of the peace.
2nd. That the government of the United States is clothed with appro-
priate authority and functions to enforce the delivery on claim of the
owner, and has properly exercised it in the Act of Congress of 12th Feb-
ruary, 1793.
3rd. That any state law or regulation which interrupts, impedes, limits,
embarrasses, delays or postpones the right of the owner to the immediate
possession of the slave, and the immediate command of his service, is
void.
This Court has not decided that state legislation in aid of the claimant,
and which does not directly nor indirectly delay, impede or frustrate the
master in the exercise of his right under the Constitution, or in pursuit of
his remedy given by the Act of Congress, is void. .ells v. T e State of
Illinois. Opinion per GRiER, J.
IWll-Fraudulcnt Debtor-Parties to Bill.-A court of equity has
jurisdiction of a bill against the administrator of a deceased debtor, and
the person to whom real and personal property was conveyed by the
deceased debtor, for the purpose of defrauding creditors.
In such a ease the Court does not exercise an auxilliary jurisdiction to
aid legal process, and consequently it is not necessary that the creditor
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should be in a condition to levy anc execution, if the fraudulent obstacle
should be removed.
It is proper to make a prior incumbrancer, who holds the legal title,
and whose debt is payable, a party to the bill, in order that the whole
title may be sold under the decree; for the purpose of such a decrce the
prior incumbraneer is a necessary party; but the Court may order a sale
subject to the incumbrance, without having the prior incumbrancer before
it, and in fit cases it will do so. If the prior incumbrancer is out of the
jurisdiction, or cannot be joined without defeating it, it is a fit cause to
dispense with his presence, and order a sale subject to his incumbrance,
which will not be affected by the decree. .Hagan v. Pope. Opinion per
CURTIs, J.
Mr Contract-Neutralit-Lex loci.-The plaintiffs, in September,
1836, during the war between Mexico and Texas, and before the indepen-
dence of the latter was acknowledged by the United States, entered into a
contract with the defendant, reciting "That the said parties of the first
part, being desirous of assisting the said Gen. T. Jefferson Chambers, who
is now engaged in raising, arming and equipping volunteers for Texas,
and who is in want of means*therefor, and being extremely desirous to
advance the cause of freedom, and the independence of Texas, have agreed
to purchase of said Chambers" certain lands, and to pay therefor the sum
of $12,500, in certain instalments. Chambers covenanted to hold the
legal title to the lands in trust for the use of the plaintiff, and to convey
the same with warranty, under the penalty of $30,000 liquidated damages.
On demurrer to a bill to enforce the specific execution of this contract,
and averring payment of the consideration, it was decided-Ist. That con-
tracts by citizens of the United States, to furnish money to carry on a war
by revolted subjects, against a government with whom we are at peace,
will not be enforced by a court of equity.
2d. That this contract was in violation of -the neutrality laws of the
United States, as it might fairly be inferred from the recitals, that the
defendant was the engaged "in raising, arming and equipping volunteers
for Texas" in the United States, and therefore void.
3d. That this contract, being made at Cincinnati, must, in deciding its
validity, be judged by the laws of the United States, and not by those of
Texas. Bennett v. Chambers. Opinion by TANEY, 0. J.
D-.NIELS and Gimrt, Justices, dissented, on the ground that a contract
to convey lands in Texas must be treated as a Texan contract, and its vali-
dity judged by the laws of Texas, which could not recognise such a defence.
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Selections front32 Maine Reports.1
Abortion.-To procure an abortion, as to a female, pregnant but not
quick with child, was not, at the common law, an offence, if done with her
consent. Smit v. State.
By our statute the procuring of an abortion is an offence, whether the
child had quickened or not, and whether with or without the consent of
the mother. Ibid.
Bills and Promisory .'Motcs.-In an action against the maker of a note,
payable at a specified length of time after its date, brought by an indorsee,
who obtained it for value before its apparent pay day, and without know-
ledge of mistake in its date, the maker, in order to establish a defence that
the action was prematurely brought, is not allowed to prove, that by mis-
take the note bore a date earlier than the day upon which it was actually
made. Huston v. Young.
A subscribing witness to a note need not write thereon for what pur-
pose he affixes his signature. Farnsworth v. Rowe.
If one write his name on the note, at- the place commonly used for
attestations, the presumption is, that he writes it, not as a maker of the
note, but as a subscribing witness. Ibid.
There is no presumption in law that an unnegotiable note, of the same
amount of a pre-existing book debt, and taken for the debt, was received
as 2ayment of the debt. Bartlett v. 'lMayo.
The recovery and payment of a judgment upon the account would bar
an action upon the note. bild.
In such an action, if it appear that such a note was given, it is not
necessary that the plaintiff produce the note or account for its loss. ibid.
Consideration.-To support an action upon a written agreement to pay
the debt of another, a consideration for the contract must be proved. Cut-
ler v. Everett.
From an agreement on a separate paper, to be responsible for the pay-
ment of a note, though of the same date, described as having been given
by a third person, no inference of a consideration is to be drawn. Ibil.
'We are indebted for the following abstracts to Mr. Reddington, the State
Reporter of 'Maine, who has obligingly furnized us with the sheets of his forthcom-
ing volume. The abstracts shall be continued in our next number.
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Constitutional Law.-It is competent for the State, by legislative enact-
ment, operating prospectively, to determine that articles, injurious to the
public health or morals, shall not constitute property. Preston v. Drew.
If it should so conclude in relation to spirituous or intoxicating drinks,
when designed to be used as a beverage, the conclusion would be justified
by the experience and history of man, and would furnish no occasion to
complain that any provision of the constitution had been violated. Ibid.
The general intent and avowed purposes of the Act of 1851, "for the
supression of drinking houses and tippling shops," would not be infringed
by a construction which should allow the maintenance of actions, except
for such liquors as were, liable to seizure and forfeiture, and intended for
unlawful sale. Ibid.
The attaching of such a construction to legislative language, so clear and
unequivocal, if within the province of the judiciary department, is perhaps
very near to the outward boundary of its power. Ibid.
If such a construction should be applied, it would, of course, remove
the statute prohibition from all actions brought for liquors, except those
proved to have been intended for unlawful sale. Ibid.
Without such a construction, the statute prohibitiqn is inoperative, as
to actions for any liquors, except those proved to have been intended for
unlawful sale, because as to other liquors the prohibition is violative of
the State Constitution. Ibid.
The requirement of the constitution in reference to search warrants,
that "A special designation of the place to be searched" shall be made, is
not answered by words, which, if used in a conveyaice, would not convey
it, and which would not confine the search to one building or place. State
v. Spirituous Li'uors; Robinson, claimant.
Under that constitutional provision, an article to be searched for, may,
in the warrant, be despribed simply by its generic name, if it be destitute
of any peculiar and known marks or qualities, by which, in the descrip-
tion, it can be distinguished from other articles of the same general name.
Ibid.
Thus, a warrant for the search of "spirituous or intoxicating liquors,"
will not be considered unauthorized for the want of a sufficient designation
of the thing to be searched for. ibid.
Contract.-A contract obtained by fraudulent representations cannot be
sustained by the fraudulent party to the injury of the party imposed upon.
Pratt v. -Philbrook..
